Belief, preference and willingness under ambiguity.

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Ambiguity aversion originally reported in conjunction with Ellsberg paradox appears to have established a law-like status in both empirical and normative researches that are mostly confined in the betting context. The present paper was designed to test its generality in a wider, natural context, using three psychological measures belief, preference and willingness. Subjects responded to these measures in the choice problems of a hospital and a driving-school that differed in the locus of control over outcome uncertainties. The effects of framing and relativity of uncertainty were examined as the between-subjects factors. The results were in sharp contrast with the previous findings. That is, there was little evidence for ambiguity aversion, but ambiguity seeking and indifference were predominant. Ambiguity seeking was more pronounced in willingness than in belief. Through the MANOVA tests, the effects of framing and the relativity of uncertainty information were confirmed in belief and willingness, respectively. The problem effect was found not in these measures, but in qualitative willingness expressed in a binary mode. Finally, ambiguity seeking was also reflected in the preference rankings of the sites in which only the relativity effect was important. Further investigations are required to examine (a) how the factors (externality-internality of uncertainty control, relativity of uncertainty information and positive-negative framing) affect belief, preference and willingness, and (b) the extent to which present findings are truly attributable to the non-gambling and natural settings.
公益社団法人日本心理学会の論文

Belief, preference and willingness under ambiguity.

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