企業金融論の展開(II) : 非対称情報と投資の効率性(中田信正教授退任記念号)

概要

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In this part of our papers, we survey and review two models of corporate finance theory. The first model by Myers and Majluf (1984) shows that under asymmetric information about firm's "project return" the firm's issue of equity delivers bad signal, so with certain condition firm may postpone the investment project. Therefore, this turns out to emerge the under-investment problem. Because that model assumes the investors are "passive". But we show that if investors act rational, that model concludes film's investment decisions are irrelevant of the resource of external funds, so called "MM theorem". The second model by Brennan and Kraus (1986) shows that under asymmetric information about firm's "types", the firm cannot face the under-investment problem since it can choice the external funds which minimize the repayment. In other words, each firm can always lead to the efficiency of investment. But we show that only equity issue can lead to the investment efficiency. If the requirements of investment exceed the internal funds, investment efficiency cannot be achieved by common debt. Moreover, we discuss the case of convertible bonds. And we show that investment efficiency can be achieved only if the convertible bonds are called before project return reveals.
桃山学院大学の論文