生産量決定と脱税決定に関する「分離可能命題」の再検討

概要

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In this paper, we demonstrate an alternative model that shows that a firm's tax evading activity under profit taxation, when endogenously determined in a monopoly firm, has a utility function of risk aversion. To do this, we introduce the disutility (moral) function of tax evasion, rather than of the endogenized detection probability and / or the penalty rate. We also assume that a monopoly firm is able to evade taxes on profits by overstating production costs. We show that the "Separability Proposition," which states that a firm's output and tax evasion decisions are independently determined, holds under our basic model. However, it is shown that even if tax evasion is generally profitable, a monopoly firm evaluating its tax evasion by claiming zero production costs does not evade its profit taxes when the tax evasion's marginal disutility is larger than its marginal utility. Our basic model can be easily extended to intertemporal cases. For simplicity, we analyze a two-period model and show that the "Separability Proposition" also holds true. Moreover, we show that, in spite of the time length, the larger the detection probability or penalty rate, the smaller the rate of overstating production costs. However, these have ambiguous effects with an increase in the profit tax rate.
桃山学院大学の論文
2007-06-20