貿易自由化ゲームにおける最小定常解の可能性

概要

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Within the framework of the theory of social situations developed by Greenberg, J. [1990], we reconsider Matsuyama's trade liberalization game (Matsuyama [1990]) played between the government of a country and a firm of an import competing industry. We first show that there exists a finite number of solutions which satisfy both the internal and the external stabilities, and that the solutions exhibit essentially the same outcomes as the subgame-perfect equilibria. Further, by replacing the internal stability with other three properties: stationarity ; minimality ; and non-empty valuedness, we show that there exists another kind of solution, which, in a sense, refines the subgame perfect equilibria and always gives rise to the socially optimal outcome.
関西学院大学の論文