Farsighted Stability と貿易自由化ゲーム

概要

論文の詳細を見る
We consider a trade liberalization game between the government of a country and a domestic firm in an import competing industry. We assume that the government and the firm can negotiate freely, openly, and costlessly, but they can not move jointly. We examine the stable outcomes under two different scenarios : one in which the players are myopic ; the other in which the players are farsighted enought to understand the final outcomes that follow sequences of negotiation between the players. In each case, we show the existence of a unique stable set. The stable set under the players' myopic behavior implies that the players stick to the "status quo"-the government does not liberalize the market and the firm does not invest. On the other hand, the stable set under the players' farsighted behavior implies the socially optimal temporal protection-the firm invests for technological improvement before liberalization and the government liberalizes the market after the firm's investment.
神戸大学の論文
2000-03-10