双方独占における威嚇と安定解 : 純粋交換モデルによる分析

概要

論文の詳細を見る
In a two player, two commodity, pure exchange economy framework, we examine how the exchange of commodities is carried out under such circumstances that each player holds the whole endowment of a particular commodity (a bilateral monopoly) ; the players can form a coalition, but each player can break away from it freely ; each player can make a "unilateral offer" or a "threat" about how much of a commodity s/he will give to the other. Using the theory of social situations, which is an alternative form of game theory developed by Greenberg (1990), we show the existence of an infinite number of "solutions"-called the "stable standards of behavior"-that will be followed by the players voluntarily. The solution we find in this paper is closely related to the "core." Each stable standard of behavior supports at least one core allocation. However, for any given core allocation, there exists at least one stable standard of behavior that supports the core allocation.
神戸大学の論文
1997-03-10