コアと安定的な自発的交換ルール

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In a two player, two commodity, pure exchange economy framework, we consider how the exchange of commodities is carried out under circumstances such that each player can make "unilateral offers" or "threats" non-cooperatively about how much of a commodity to give to the other ; at the same time, the players can make "mutually beneficial offers" cooperatively. In this setting, we seek rules for exchange that will be followed (or, at least, will not be rejected) by all the players. Such a rule (if it exists) is called a "stable standard of behavior" (SSB for short) or a "stable exchange rule." We first examine the stability of an exchange rule associated with the "core." Unfortunately, in certain circumstances, it fails to be "stable." Even if this is the case, we can show the existence of an SSB, which supports not only a core allocation, but also some non-core (even non-Pareto-efficient) allocations. Under this SSB, one of the players can obtain nearly the highest welfare that can be achieved on the core, but, the other player only obtains nearly the lowest welfare-in this sense, this SSB can be said to be "discriminatory." Further we show that the discriminatory SSB will work as a punishment-discouragement mechanism : when the favored player deviates from the SSB, it punishes the deviating player heavily, in the sense that the player's utility level after the punishment is lower than that before the deviation ; on the other hand, when the player who is discriminated against deviates from the SSB, it does not punish the deviating player so heavily, in the sense that the player's utility level after the punishment is the same as that before the deviation.
神戸大学の論文
1999-03-10

コアと安定的な自発的交換ルール

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