地球温暖化対策の国際合意形成に関する動的ゲームシミュレーション

概要

論文の詳細を見る
Once the human CO_2 emission level exceeds a certain threshold, there is a risk of changing global carbon cycle. In this study, we have developed a simulation model for the international institutional regime which tries to manage the long-term global carbon cycle. In the modeling, global carbon budget vulnerabilities, carbon management cost/benefit and successive international negotiation process are described using differential game approach. Using this model, we have simulated the global carbon management regime formation by international players with different CO_2 emission risk averseness. The analysis have shown that : 1) CO_2 concentration level of the competitive solution was between that of the cooperative solution and the solution when the players ignore the climate damage and regime effectiveness increases with the risk averseness, 2) in the case of heterogeneous players, if the risk averseness is different for the same emission level, it was observed that the increases of the difference of the risk averseness between the players reduce the stable CO_2 concentration level. Furthermore, the player with higher risk averseness would even try to reduce the emission more to cover inadequate emission reduction effort with lower risk averseness player.
日本シミュレーション学会の論文
2005-12-15