大正9年1-2月期におけるバブル経済(I)(経済学部開設50周年記念号)

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The money market got seriously tight in the end of 1919 and the rates of call loan soared so that money supply reached the record level. But in the new year the money demand calmed and the rates of call loan fell. Banks still hesitated to lend money in the long term. The long term interest rates stayed at higher level. As a result bond prices went down. While funds raised in the capital market were fixed to the real capital, their loans were difficult to liquidate and some loans turned sour. Banks tried to raise funds from public but the interest rates of deposit were so low that people drew their deposit and speculated their money to stocks and commodities. People were accustomed to the bubble and felt "euphoria" to the future. And many newspapers and journals presented them an optimistic forecast of stocks and commodities. In face of such heated boom, many mass-media expected a rise of the discount rate of BOJ. But the BOJ didn't rise it so that the bubble ballooned futhermore. In real economy there were symptoms of depression in terms of the trade deficit, tight money and inflation. The government ought to take anti-inflation policies but the political issue of the greatest importance of those days was not the inflation but universal suffrage so that the Hara Cabinet didn't take any effective measures to the inflation and left bubbles. And very few mass-media criticized this lack of policy. The Japanese as a whole were paralized by the bubble. (to be continued)
2010-03-31

著者

望月和彦
桃山学院大学経済学部

大正9年1-2月期におけるバブル経済(I)(経済学部開設50周年記念号)

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