成熟社会における財政金融政策(I)
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概要
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The Japanese economy slipped into recession as the government raised the consumption tax rate from 3% to 5%. In 1995 and 1996 Japanese economy recorded the highest growth rate among advanced countries thanks to both the huge spending policy by the government and the easy monetary policy by the central bank. But the government changed the policy to austere one and tried to increase its tax revenue. The policy change suppressed the personal consumption. Then in the autumn of 1997 a series of bankruptcy in financial sector gave rise to the national anxiety, uncertainty and risk about the future of the Japanese economy. That is the real cause of the recession Japan now suffers. After the burst of bubble economy, the Japanese government has spent 100 trillion yen to revive its economy, and the Bank of Japan set the discount rate to the historical low level of 0.5% for three and a half years. But in the end the Japanese economy is in turmoil. Thus it seems that the economic policies so far are not effective. So the Keynesian economics seems to be not valid any more not only from the term of theory but also of experience. In fiscal policies, the income tax cut policy has been not effective and gave rise to a distortion of tax burden among individuals. And putting down the consumption tax rate is unlikely to cause increasing consumption because people expect tax rate to rise again when the economy manages to evacuate from the depression. The government spending also failed to prop up the economy. In Japan the investment of public sector has been larger than any other advanced countries. Meanwhile, the social infrastructure is poor in Japan. That means the efficacy of the construction sector is very low. As a result, while the economy remains stagnant, the public debt accumlates sharply. The monetary policy has also failed to save the economy and the easy money policy brought a severe by-product to the economy. There is no Keynesian "liquidity trap" in Japan because the interest rate goes down by the easy money policy. But the investment doesn't respond to the low interest. So the monetary policy is not effective. Meanwhile, the Japanese people have received meagle interest income by the low interest. The merits of low interest goes to banks and firms which borrow from the banks. On the other hand, insurance companies and pension funds suffer from the low interest. While the Japanese banks enjoy a huge profit from the easy money policy, they have left the bad loan problem. The Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan take protective measures called "convoy system" to the financial sector. Such administrative posture blocks the banks to deal with bad loan problem. As a result, while the increase of money doesn't bring economic recovery , the asset content of the central bank deteriorates. These fiscal and monetary policies results in locking the economic resources to the unproductive sector. That is the real cause of depression. And the government and central bank are likely to go bankrupt. It will cause a meltdown of the society and opne the way to fascism.
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