エージェント侵略の過程と中間的な手をとる戦略の有利性について

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Recently, multi-agent systems have been studied diversely. The authors have proposed the iterated continuous prisoner's dilemma game in order to study on elastic interactions between agents. This is a continuous version of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Each agent does not choose his action from two alternatives but from a continuous range in this game. So far, one-to-one plays have been analyzed on the invasion relation. In this research, we extend this relation to aprocess. Namely, we define the process of invasion as three phases, 1) invasion of a single strategy, 2) invasion by a cluster, and 3) invasion by a group. The purpose of this research is to investigate the profitability of a strategy taking an intermediate action in the process of invasion and to clarify differences between this profitability and that of a strategy choosing his action from two alternatives. TFT is a well-known good strategy in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. A group of TFT's is not invaded in the case that a strategy chooses his action between two alternatives. We also focus on TFT in this research. TFT can take intermediate actions in our continuous version. We analyze the process of invasion upon a group of TFT-like strategy DTFT's taking only discrete actions. Then we compare the profitability of DTFT with that of TFT. And in order to investigate taking intermediate actions explicitly, we consider another TFT-like strategy TFT^g. We define TFT^g modified TFT so as to take inexact actions, where we call g an inexactlizing function. Namely, the inexactlization of actions means changing original actions to more intermediate values. Then we analyze the process of invasion by TFT upon a group of TFT^g's and so on.
社団法人人工知能学会の論文
1999-07-01

エージェント侵略の過程と中間的な手をとる戦略の有利性について

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