ON THE EQUIVALENCY OF BALANCEDNESS AND STABILITY IN EFFECTIVITY FUNCTION GAMES

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概要

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• In this paper we first introduce effectivity functions and some of their properties, especially balancedness. By using a specific characteristic function which enables us to transform a game in the effectivity function form into that of the characteristic function form, we show that, balancedness of the effectivity functions is sufficient for the stability, i.e., the existence of the core whatever preference ordering each player has. Our main result states that balancedness is a necessary and sufficient, condition for the stability as long as the effectivity functions satisfy anonymity and neutraility.

• 社団法人日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会の論文

著者

• Mizutani Masayoshi

  Department Of Business Administration Tokyo Keizai University

• Lee Nae-chan

  Keio University

• Nishino Hisakazu

  Keio University

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