A BARGAINING APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS: EQUIVALENCY BETWEEN THE ASYMMETRIC NASH SOLUTION AND THE CONSTRAINED WEIGHTED AWARD SOLUTION

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概要

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• This paper generalizes the constrained equal award rule (or, solution), one of well-known allocation rules of a bankruptcy problem so that differences of relative importance over agents can be reflected and shows that the asymmetric Nash solution coincides with such a generalized solution called the constrained weighted award solution over a bargaining problem with the 0 disagreement point derived from a bankruptcy problem. This result is further extended to cover those problems with the non-zero disagreement point.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Lee Nae-chan

  Keio University

関連論文

• ON THE EQUIVALENCY OF BALANCEDNESS AND STABILITY IN EFFECTIVITY FUNCTION GAMES
• A BARGAINING APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS: EQUIVALENCY BETWEEN THE ASYMMETRIC NASH SOLUTION AND THE CONSTRAINED WEIGHTED AWARD SOLUTION

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