THE HYPERCORE ON SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEM

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概要

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• In this paper, a class of stable and coalitionally nonmanipulable social choice correspondences is presented. Each correspondence in this class, called the hypercore, is induced from a social choice function with restricted domain of preference profile. It is proved that the correspondence is the intersection of cores over an equivalent class of profiles. On the contrary to Demange's max-max criterion, max-min criterion is adopted for defining a coalitional nonmanipulability. Although the core induced from a coalitionally nonmanipulable social choice function with a restricted domain does not necessarily satisfy the nonmanipulability in the max-min sense, it is shown the hypercore does.

• 社団法人日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会の論文

著者

• Mizutani Masayoshi

  Tokyo Keizai University

• Nishino Hisakazu

  Keio University

• Cui Wentian

  Toyohashi University of Technology

• Satoh Yuuji

  Matsusaka University

• Cui W

  Toyohashi University Of Technology

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