NOTES ON THE STABILITY OF QUADRATIC GAMES

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概要

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• The stability of the equilibrium for quadratic games is examined under the assumption that each player forms adaptively expectations on other player's strategies and/or variables which are linear combinations of other players' strategies. In this paper a discrete time scale is assumed. As applications, the multiproduct oligopoly game is investigated under three different kinds of assumptions about the dynamic behaviour of the players.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Szidarovszky Ferenc

  Karl Marx University Of Economics

• OKUGUCHI Koji

  Tokyo Metropolitan University

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