NASH-COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM FOR AN INDUSTRY WITH OLIGOPOLY AND A COMPETITIVE FRINGE

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• The Nash-Cournot equilibrium for an industry with a cartel and a competitive fringe has been analyzed by economists interested in exhaustible resources. In this paper the existence and stability of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for an industry with oligopolists behaving independently one another without any cooperation among themselves and with many small firms forming a competitive fringe are proven under a set of general conditions.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• OKUGUCHI Koji

  Tokyo Metropolitan University

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