COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH PROFIT-MAXIMIZING AND LABOR-MANAGED FIRMS
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概要
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First, we prove the existence and stability of a unique Cournot equilibrium for duopoly with one profit-maximizing firm and one labor-managed firm. Second, we present a new method for establishing the existence of the Cournot equilibrium for oligopoly with several profit-maximizing and labor-managed firms. This method is then applied to examine the effects of entry on the equilibrium values of some crucial variables. Though the Cournot oligopoly with several profit-maximizing and labor-managed firms is shown to be quasi-competitive regardless of the type of the entrant, the effects of entry differ for some variables according to the type of the entrant.
- 慶應義塾大学の論文
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