CONTRIBUTION TO OLIGOPOLY THEORY: THE CASE OF UNCERTAIN COLLUSIONS

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• Several studies dealt with uncertainty on games from different points of view. Uncertainty of strategy sets, pay-off functions, and uncertainty in the number of players were investigated by many authors, but no one focused on uncertainty in players' collusion. To represent uncertainty certain deterministic and stochastic information formulas are used. We show how the strategy selection process of a certain player depends on the type of information he has. Then we provide solution concepts for different types of information and evaluate the value of information. The paper illustrates some examples on a simple one-product oligopoly model.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Szidarovszky Ferenc

  Karl Marx University Of Economics

• Okuguchi Koji

  Department Of Economics Tokyo Metropolitan University

• Okuguchi Koji

  Department Of Economics And Information Gifu Shotoku Gakuen University Gifu Japan

• FLUCK Zsuzsanna

  Computer Center of Planning Office

関連論文

• NOTES ON THE STABILITY OF QUADRATIC GAMES
• COURNOT VS STACKELBERG: THE CASE OF LABOR-MANAGED DUOPOLY
• AD VALOREM AND SPECIFIC TAXES, AND OPTIMAL PIGOUVIAN TAX WITHIN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY
• LONG-RUN FISH STOCK AND IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL FISHING
• Optimal Pollution Tax in Cournot Oligopoly
• CONTRIBUTION TO OLIGOPOLY THEORY: THE CASE OF UNCERTAIN COLLUSIONS
• EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICY FOR INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

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