Hamilton & Slutsky (1990）定理７の構造

概要

論文の詳細を見る
In this paper, we consider two commitment games in Hamilton&Slutsky(1990)．The condition for the existence of the mixed strategy equilibria is shown by theorem 5 for the extended game with observable delay. In this case, the refinement by subgame perfectness concept for the equilibria being valid fully over all of 5 subgames, the strategy pair not locates on the intersection of two best reply curves leads to a contradiction. This eases the difficulties of the analysis to verify the mixed strategy equilibria. In the case of the extended game of action commitment, if both players choose wait strategy, the best reply induced in the following stage inevitably leads to select the intersection of two best reply curves. On the contrary to this, comittment strategy by both does not always come to the intersection. The proof that an action commitment game does not have a mixed strategy equilibria remains unproved so far. In this paper, one solution to this existence problem is suggested by Theorem1． In every duoply game satisfying some regular conditions as in Pastine&Pastine(2004)，there is no nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria carried by commitments which is located in Pareto superior set.
2010-06-30