クールノーゲームの均衡とシュタッケルベルグゲームの均衡における生産量比率

概要

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In this paper we consider the conditions under which the quantity level produced by the second player exceed to the level produced by the first player in Stackelberg quantity setting duopoly game in the case that both firms have liner demand functions and quadratic cost functions. If the both coefficients in the cost functions are sufficiently small and grater than-1, there is a second mover advantage in terms profit having concave isoprofit curve and the downward sloping best reply functions. In the case that the duopoly games considered here have sufficiently decreasing marginal returns that means there is a scale economy, negative marginal cost happens to be true, and these conditions carrying out the second mover firms to be advantagous in terms of profit level and the level of output. The same result is obtained in the Cournot quantity setting game in which both firms have liner demand functions and quadratic cost functions.
長崎大学の論文
2004-12-27