外部経済と後手有利性について

概要

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In this paper we consider the output levels in the equilibrium of Cournot quantity setting duopoly game and Stackelberg quantity setting duopoly game in which both firm have liner demand functions and quadratic cost functions. If there is a sufficiently effective and positive outer economy which operates in favor of the first firm, the concavity of the shape of isoprofit curve disappear and the convexity of it newly turns out, while the shape of the best reply functions remain unchanged and have negative signs as is the case of duopoly game with no outer economy. In this case the second mover is advantageous in terms of profit and the output level is greater than it of the first mover, Stackelberg equilibria being located to the left of Cournot equilibria. This condition is crucial to the the second mover advantage.
長崎大学の論文
2006-02-24