Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
The purpose of this paper is to reveal how fiscal policy cooperation can result fromrepeated interactions in an asymmetric model of capital tax competition. We investigatehow regional differences in the per capita capital endowments and/or production technologiesaffects the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordinationin a multi-period framework. It is shown not only that there may exist cases where taxcoordination is facilitated as regional asymmetries increase but also that the larger theasymmetry in terms of the net capital-exporting positions among regions, the easier isthe cooperation to sustain tax coordination.(JEL classification: H73, H77)
- Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido Universityの論文
- 2006-12-11
Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University | 論文
- Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting
- Are Regional Asymmetries Detrimental to Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting?
- Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting
- Tax Incidence in Dynamic Economies with Externalities and Endogenous Labor Supply
- Private Provision of Public Goods between Families