Are Regional Asymmetries Detrimental to Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting?
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概要
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This paper reexamines the main findings of Cardarelli et al. (2002), and Contenaroand Vidal (2006), who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusionof tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition. In particular,this paper investigates how increasing regional differences in the per capita capitalendowments and/or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperatein achieving tax coordination. It is shown not only that there may exist cases wheretax coordination is facilitated with an increase in regional asymmetries increase and thegreater the degree of asymmetry in terms of the net capital exports of the regions, butalso that the higher the cooperation of the regions with respect to the sustenance of taxcoordination.
- Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido Universityの論文
- 2007-06-18
Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University | 論文
- Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting
- Are Regional Asymmetries Detrimental to Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting?
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