Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable.
- Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido Universityの論文
- 2008-10-19
Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University | 論文
- Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting
- Are Regional Asymmetries Detrimental to Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting?
- Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting
- Tax Incidence in Dynamic Economies with Externalities and Endogenous Labor Supply
- Private Provision of Public Goods between Families