(中央銀行研究-2)政府と中央銀行の関係(下)
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概要
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Prof. W. D. Nordhaus proposed 'the politcal business cycle', which meant that the government executed consciously lowering the level of unemployment at the period of the election for the purpose of wining it, following the raise of inflation in accordance with 'phillips curue'. Therefore tight money policy is inevitable to execute after the election and results in raising the level of unemployment. The theory of the political business cycle neglets or denies the independence and the function of the central bank. The process of decision making of the monetary policy is actually a kind of bargaining tactics between the goverment and the central bank. It happens the fluctuation of real economy which I call 'the bureaucratic business cycle'.
- 日本福祉大学の論文
- 1998-02-01
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