アリストテレスの弁証術におけるτο τι ην ειναι (本質)

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I offer an interpretation of the origin of how and why the phrase το τι ην ειναι (hereafter essence) is employed, by giving an account of the context in which essence is introduced and its linguistic structure. In "The Topics" Aristotle develops a method by means of which one can formally examine whether any proposed proposition is well said or not. This method of establishing and rejecting any proposition is developed as Topos theory. Topos is the locution of argument or the point at issue on the basis of which a questioner examines a proposition proposed by the counterpart of dialogue i. e. an answerer. Aristotle must have thought that Socratic dialectic is ad hoc as a method in the sense that his inquiry into definition by examining another's thesis always comes to a dead-end. Aristotle criticizes Socratic dialogue as follows ; "it was natural that Socrates should be seeking the essence,--there was as yet none of the dialectical power which enables people even without the "what is it?" to speculate about contraries"(1078b23-26). I take it that Aristotle strengthens dialectic by creating a system of inquiry into "what it is" and to deal with contraries without directly asking the question "what is it?". Dialectic argument must not raise the problem by asking the question "what is it?", but raise it like "whether is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man or not?" so as to be answered by just saying "yes or no"(101b32, 158a16). The main ingredients of Topos theory are four predicables (definition, unique property, genus and accident) of which every proposition is composed. Predicables are the ways of predicate's belonging to its subject. While "definition is a phrase which signifies essence", "unique property is what does not refer essence for some subject but belongs only to it and counterpredicates with it"(101b38, 102a18). In this way, any proposed proposition is classified into one of these four predicables. Since these four predicables are exclusive of one another, the reference of essence is fixed with respect to other three predicables and introduced as a technical phrase in the introduction of predicables. One common feature among these is that "all these are definitory"(102b34). Even accident is alleged to be regarded as "definitory", because nothing prevents it from temporarily "becoming unique property", a kind of identity which is the necessary condition for definition(102b21f, cf. 102a7-10). I claim that these four predicables are proposed to deal with all possible answers of the Socratic question "what is it?". An important characteristic in the Socratic practice of inquiring into definition is that he rejects the kind of answers which are given by examples i. e. accidents and asks again the object itself. For example, Socrates asks "what do you think knowledge is?". Theaetetus answers by giving examples of knowledge such as geometry. Socrates responds to this by saying "We put the question, not because we wanted to count them, but because we wanted to know what, exactly, knowledge itself is"(Theae., 146c-e, cf. Euth., 6d, Laches, 190e). This shows that the question "what is it?" in the Greek language can be answered by being given an example and also by an object itself. I claim that το τι ην ειναι is coined by Aristotle to convey the object itself so as to avoid confusions which took place between Socrates who has only one way of asking i. e. "τι εστι;" and the answerer. If this interpretation is right, the linguistic structure of essence will be made clear. I will just focus on the reason why the imperfect ην is employed. Goodwin writes in his Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses that "The imperfect ην may express a fact which is just recognized as such by the speaker or writer, having previously been denied, overlooked, or not understood" (13). I call this use of ην "dialectical imperfect". This use accords very well with the dialectical situation where the question of the thing itself is asked afresh : When an example is given as an answer, the questioner, recognizing what is overlooked and misunderstood, asks again what the thing itself is. Thus, Aristotle develops the method of dialectic as Topos theory on the basis of predicables. The normativeness of Topos theory is gained from the normativeness of the current language in the Academy. Division theory on the basis of inductive method is its main current language. Essence is signified by the definition composed of genus and its difference. Essence is properly λογικω&b.sigmav; discussed. Λογικω&b.sigmav; is the method of linguistic inquiry from the view point of "how to express" which can claim an assertion of being on the basis of necessity of argument. Essence is λογικω&b.sigmav; characterized as "to be the very thing what is" which may be tautologous but claims a mode of being i. e. the object itself(141a35, cf. 73b8, 1030a3). In this way, essence is introduced in the dialectical context to express what Socrates sought for in his inquiry into definition.
日本西洋古典学会の論文
1999-03-23

アリストテレスの弁証術におけるτο τι ην ειναι (本質)

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