専売店制に対する独占禁止法による規制(高木絋一教授退職記念特集)

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In this article, we examined the development and problems of the regulation of sole agency arrangement under the Antimonopoly Act.　The early cases on exclusive dealing made it illegal to exclude forcibly competing products from distributors. Some of the later cases were that influential manufacturers in a market simultaneously conducted resale price maintenance and exclusive dealing. The Tokyo High Court quashed the decision of the Fair Trade Commission by the reason of insufficiency of substantial evidence on the Toyo Seimaiki case and referred the case back to the Fair Trade Commission. However the Tokyo High Court did not accept the main insistence of the petitioner. Finally the Toyo Seimaiki admitted his defeat on the consent decision. In cases where a restriction on handling of competing products is imposed by an influential manufacturer in a market, and if the restriction may result in making it difficult for new entrants or competitors to easily secure alternative distribution channels, it dose not seem to me that establishing the case is difficult.　While on the level of wholesalers the sole agency arrangement are said to have considerably spread, there is no case under the Antimonopoly Act. In cases where two or more manufacturers respectively and parallelly restrict handling of competing products, it might be difficult to establish the specific illegal conduct. Many manufacturers might own more than 50% of stocks of sole agency and might be beyond the regulation.　While some of exclusive dealings may serve to enhance economic efficiency, there is no formal decision that takes economic efficiency into consideration. However some of economic efficiencies seem to be acknowledged. Some of them might be acutually realized with tolerated sole agency.
山形大学の論文
2008-02-15

著者

藤田稔
山形大学人文学部法経政策学科

専売店制に対する独占禁止法による規制(高木絋一教授退職記念特集)

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