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The experimental game is usually considered as a way of studying interpersonal conflict, intrapersonal conflicting motives, inter-group problems, and so on. It has not been accepted as an experimental method to study human interaction processes. A given game structure is an independent variable in the experiment, and interaction between players is fixedly imbedded into the game structure. Since it could not be a dependent variable, we can not observe behaviors such as those specific to human interaction processes. On the whole by constructing a dynamic game structure, sometime it is possible to have a game in which a player shows game behavior that is typically interacting behavior. For example, in our former study, we changed the value of specific elements of the 2×2 prisoner's dilemma type payoff matrix trial by trial depending on the player's joint game behavior. In this experiment, as the game play goes on, the value of matrix variable elements comes to have some specific values and changes within a rather narrow range, and dyads seem to form implicit agreements on their game choice behavior. This behavior is interpreted as role-taking behavior or normatively controlled behavior that is specific to human interaction behavior. Implicit communicative behavior which is rather easier in our dynamic experimental situation than in the usual static case, is supposed to be the explanation for the findings above on interaction specific behavior. Thus, the next step is to discuss a means for constructing a game structure in which we are able to separate communicative behavior operationally from actual game choice behavior.
帯広畜産大学の論文
1977-03-25

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中原淳一
帯広畜産大学心理学研究室

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