配分ゲームの構成 : 相互交渉過程の行動論的分析のために

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In experimental game studies the prisoner's dilemma game has been used very frequently. Through its use we have acquired a considerable amount of knowledge on human behavior in this situation, and it still keeps stimulating researchers. However, it has been pointed out that the strict game theoretical restrictions are insufficient for the behavioristic analysis of social interaction processes. In this report, the author tries to relax the 2×2 squeeze of the PD game not by adding discrete choice alternatives but by constructing a new game referved to as the resource allocation game. In this game, players are requested to allocate their positive real valued and upper bounded resources into n parts, each corresponding to each player. The utility function for each player is defined as the weighted summation of resources which are allocated to him by other players minus the total resource he uses for allocation. The rectangular arrangement of these weights constructs a matrix. Every element of this matrix might be interpreted as representing the relation held by one player to another, because some one's allocation to another is amplified, diminished, extinguished or remains the same according to the value of the weight. Therefore, the matrix is called a relation matrix. An example of a two person game which shows prisoner's dilemma characteristics is illustrated. Also an extended version of the game is discussed, and the possibility of using this game as the frame of reference of social interaction processes is exhibited.
帯広畜産大学の論文
1975-03-08

著者

中原淳一
帯広畜産大学心理学研究室

配分ゲームの構成 : 相互交渉過程の行動論的分析のために

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