Weaknesses of Two SAS-Like Password Authentication Schemes(Fundamental Theories for Communications)
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
In 2000, Sandirigama, Shimizu, and Noda proposed a simple password authentication scheme, SAS. However, SAS was later found to be flawed. Recently, Chen, Lee, Horng proposed two SAS-like schemes, which were claimed to be more secure than similar schemes. Herein, we show that both their schemes are still vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. Additionally, Chen-Lee-Horng's second scheme is not easily reparable.
- 一般社団法人電子情報通信学会の論文
- 2006-02-01
著者
-
Ku Wei-chi
Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Fu Jen Catholic University
-
Chiang Min-hung
Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Fu Jen Catholic University
関連論文
- Reflection Attack on a Generalized Key Agreement and Password Authentication Protocol(Fundamental Theories)
- Cryptanalysis of a Variant of Peyravian-Zunic's Password Authentication Scheme (Fundamental Theories)
- Stolen-Verifier Attack on an Efficient Smartcard-Based One-Time Password Authentication Scheme(Fundamental Theories)
- Weaknesses of a Remote User Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards for Multi-Server Architecture(Fundamental Theories for Communications)
- Vulnerabilities of Wu-Chieu's Improved Password Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards(Information Security)
- Cryptanalysis of a Multi-Server Password Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme Using Smart Cards(Information Security)
- Weaknesses of Two SAS-Like Password Authentication Schemes(Fundamental Theories for Communications)