Stolen-Verifier Attack on an Efficient Smartcard-Based One-Time Password Authentication Scheme(Fundamental Theories)
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概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
Recently, Yeh, Shen, and Hwang proposed a smartcard-based one-time password authentication scheme as an improved version of S/KEY, and claimed that their scheme is superior to other similar schemes in security and efficiency. In this letter, we show that Yeh-Shen-Hwang's scheme is still vulnerable to a stolen-verifier attack that may cause serious security problems.
- 社団法人電子情報通信学会の論文
- 2004-08-01
著者
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Tsai Hao-chuan
Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Fu Jen Catholic University
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Ku Wei-chi
Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Fu Jen Catholic University
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TSAUR Maw-Jinn
Graduate Institute of Applied Science and Engineering, Fu Jen Catholic University
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Tsaur Maw-jinn
Graduate Institute Of Applied Science And Engineering Fu Jen Catholic University
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