Cryptanalysis of a Variant of Peyravian-Zunic's Password Authentication Scheme (Fundamental Theories)
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概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
Recently, Hwang and Yeh demonstrated that Peyravian-Zunic's password authentication scheme is vulnerable to several attacks, and then proposed a modified version. In this letter, we show that Hwang-Yeh's scheme still has several weaknesses and drawbacks.
- 社団法人電子情報通信学会の論文
- 2003-05-01
著者
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Chen C‐m
National Sun Yat‐set Univ. Kaohsiung Twn
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Lee Hui-lung
Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Fu Jen Catholic University
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KU Wei-Chi
Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Fu Jen Catholic University
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CHEN Chien-Ming
Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Fu Jen Catholic University
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Ku W‐c
Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Fu Jen Catholic University
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Ku Wei-chi
Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Fu Jen Catholic University
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