合議におけるパレート原理の頑健性 : 「寡きを患えず、均しからざるを患う」?(II)

概要

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Tamura & Kameda (2004) showed that, when people evaluated the desirability of various resource allocations, their preference for an "allocation that was unfair but provided a Pareto-improvement" over other "fair" allocations was enhanced via group discussion. In their study, participants served as arbitrators who were asked to solve disputes over resource-allocation. This study was a conceptual replication of Tamura & Kameda (2004) to determine whether the prevalence of the Pareto-principle can be observed in a group situation, where interested parties discussed resource-allocation. In each experimental session, two college students worked on an anagram task individually, and then discussed how to allocate a "pair-reward" between them (n=40). The pairs were presented with three reward allocation schemes : plans based on equality, equity, or a plan that was unfair (i.e., paying more to the less productive member) but provided a Pareto-improvement over the other two plans. In line with Tamura & Kameda (2004), the results confirmed that participants' preference for the unfair but Pareto-improving allocation was enhanced substantively via group discussion.
日本社会心理学会の論文
2006-02-08