Axiomatic Approach to Nucleolus in Common Cost Allocation

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• Many researchers have tried to apply cooperative game solutions to common cost allocation in the past. They examined Shapley value as the allocation scheme in many cases. As Shapley value is derived from a set of axioms, we can justify Shapley value as the allocation scheme in common cost allocation if we can give the axioms of Shapley value relevant interpretations. Since the nucleolus is not derived from axioms originally, researchers have not adopted axiomatic approach to the nucleolus in common cost allocation. Recently, game theorists present some interesting articles in which they propose the axioms for the nucleolus. We investigate the meaning of the nucleolus axioms in common cost allocation using the results obtained in the game theory.

• 青森公立大学の論文
• 1997-03-15

著者

• 青木 雅明

  青森公立大学経営経済学部

• 青木 雅明

  青森公立大学

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