Various Nucleoli in Common Cost Allocation

スポンサーリンク

概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• The nucleolus is a cooperative game solution proposed by Schmeidler [1969]. While the nucleolus has desirable properties as the allocation scheme of common cost, researchers who study common cost allocation have not paid attention to the nucleolus. Gately [1974] proposes "propensity to disrupt" as a dissatisfaction measure in a characteristic function form game. Littlechild and Vaidya [1976] and Charnes and Seiford [1978] extend "propensity to disrupt" and propose the disruption nucleolus. Young et al. [1980] proposes two new nucleoli based on the least core. The purpose of this article is to examine the properties of the various nucleoli in common cost allocation.

• 青森公立大学の論文
• 1997-03-15

著者

• 青木 雅明

  青森公立大学経営経済学部

• 青木 雅明

  青森公立大学

関連論文

• The Design of the Self-Study System for Cost Accounting Using Web Browser
• 管理会計教育における表計算ソフトの利用
• 総合原価計算の練習問題作成における表計算ソフトの利用
• Axiomatic Approach to Nucleolus in Common Cost Allocation
• Various Nucleoli in Common Cost Allocation
• Bargaining and nucleolus in Common Cost Allocation
• A Characteristic Function in Common Cost Allocation
• The Significance of Nucleolus in Common Cost Allocation
• 管理会計教育における表計算ソフトの利用
• 総合原価計算の練習問題作成における表計算ソフトの利用

スポンサーリンク