<論説>パリ平和会議におけるイタリアの要求と米国 : イタリア・イレデンタとウィルソン (2)

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In the present issue, an analysis is made of Sonnino's efforts to formulate and execute the Italian foreign policy from the beginning of World War I to the intervention of Italy in May 1915. The writer considers this analysis is necessary in order to understand the Italian claims and Wilsonian diplomacy as well as their interaction at the Paris Peace Conference. First, Sonnino's reaction to the outbreak of the war is studied. Through examining his letters sent to Prime Minister Salandra, the writer explains how and why Sonnino's pro-Triple Alliance bearing at the very beginning of the war shifted into neutrality within a couple of months. Second, attention is paid to the fact that, in his frame of foreign policy, the primary emphasis was placed upon Italy's political and territorial expansion toward the Balkans, especially toward Albania. Taking full advantage of the European conflict, Sonnino intended to promote this plan. It was mainly for this purpose that he attempted to take as many gains as possible out of the Entente Powers in the negotiations which led to the London Treaty of 1915. Third, a brief discussion is made regarding his attitude to Italia Irredenta. Sonnino could not but make "Trento e Trieste" play a very important role for the Italian government to obtain the support of its people for the policy of intervention : it can be said that, until immediately after the opening of Italy's negotiations with the Entente, Trieste was not included in its territorial claims. Besides the all-powerful slogan of "Trento e Trieste", there were a few other means that Sonnino utilized in order to switch over the anti-war sentiment of the people to enthusiasm for intervention in the war : Bulow's proposal not to the Italian government but to Giolitti for himself; propaganda maneuvers of some influential newspapers for support of the government; and a mighty campaign by D'Annunzio, a poet and fanatic nationalist, for Italy's intervention. Finally, the writer concludes that the national sentiment of the Italian people, which was made use of by Sonnino in order to intervene in the war according to a provision of the London Treaty, was guided and controlled by strong leadership of the government just before the intervention of Italy. It should be noted, however, that after the intervention the nationalistic sentiment of the people, once flared up by the political leaders, tended to go beyond their control, gave pressure to the formulation and execution of foreign policy and finally took the initiative. (to be continued)
関西学院大学の論文
1967-09-30

著者

岡俊孝
大阪明浄大学

<論説>パリ平和会議におけるイタリアの要求と米国 : イタリア・イレデンタとウィルソン (2)

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