<論説>ロバート・ランシングの対日政策 : 石井・ランシング協定を中心として

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Few studies have been made of the foreign policy of Robert Lansing who played so significant a role in policy-making during the Wilson Administration. This paper proposes to examine the principles on which Lansing based his policy and how this policy was realized. In particular, this study is a reexamination of Lansing's motivations, purposes, and tactics in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917. The author's paper consists of following sections : I. Introduction. II. Principles of Robert Lansing's Foreign Policy. III. Historical Background and Prelude to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. IV. Lansing's Tactics in the Negotiation with Ishii. V. Conclusion. According to Lansing, moral impulses are stronger than material impulses within a state; in international society, material impulses are dominant, and physical force is the basic factor. Consequently, a realistic observation of power factors among nations is absolutely necessary for the formulation of a nation's foreign policy. For Lansing, democracy was to be defended at all costs, and democratic countries were being threatened by such autocratic powers as Germany, Russia, and Japan. Regarding Germany as the primary threat to democracy, and basing his action on an estimate of United States power in international politics, Lansing temporarily shaped a policy of the least concession to Japan. The Bryan Note of March, 1915,strongly reflected Lansing's realistic reaction to Japan's demands for special position in China. (It is noteworthy, however, that Lansing used neither special interests nor special relations in 1915.) Our interest in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is aroused by the divergence between Lansing's testimony in 1919 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the words, "special interests, " in the Agreement, and Ishii's interpretation of these words. What did Lansing really mean by special interests in the negotiation with Ishii in 1917? Ishii's dispatch to Foreign Minister Motono on September 26,1917,seems to answer this question. When Ishii insisted on paramount or prominent as describing Japan's position in China, Lansing flatly rejected these words; instead, he clearly said to Ishii, "The words, special interests, can be interpreted as one thinks fit. This is a very convenient diplomatic term......" With this evidence, we may conclude that what Lansing actually meant by special interests was contrary to his testimonies before the Senate and close to Ishii's interpretation. Therefore, based on his realistic concept of international politics and his keen observation of power relations in the Far East, Lansing's foreign policy toward Japan was to maintain the status quo in Asia. And the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, a fruit of his foreign policy, can be called a modus vivendi in the Japanese-American conflict. This study is based primarily upon the papers of Robert Lansing at the Library of Congress, the papers of Edward M. House at the Yale University Library, and the papers from the Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs microfilmed for the Library of Congress.
関西学院大学の論文
1961-08-10

著者

岡俊孝
大阪明浄大学

<論説>ロバート・ランシングの対日政策 : 石井・ランシング協定を中心として

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