Meaning and Force:--On speech-act theory--

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This paper attempts to settle certain "limit" of speech-act theory, and there, to search for what it suggests paradoxically language should be.<BR>Speech-act theory was founded by Austin, J.L., who had an intuition that language includes FORCE as an excess of MEANING of a sentence (1). From this intuition, he had obtained a recognition of FORCE as the discrepancy between language and intention, which is consist of MEANING. But, when we want to construct a consistent and general <theory> about FORCE, this recognition must be suppressed because of the meta-level necessity that one, as "speaking-subject (suject-parlant)", can never describe anything over his intention (i.e. MEANING) (2). Searle, J.'s "principle of expressibility" is the very expression of this necessity, and in this sense, it is "the" principle which starts a consistent and general speechact <theory> (3). It, as axiom, holds the transcendental authority, that cannot be threatened by any factual impossibility (4).However, the principle has enormous intension, which is contrary to itself about "the other" and "sign". This proves that language essentially functions at the territory of pure FORCE as "the outside" of the intention of "speaking-subject" (5). And from here, this paper will reveal finally that FORCE is the characters of language, that is, its dependence on "the others", its ex post facto constitution, and its provisionality (6).
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