文教予算編成過程のゲーム論的検討(VII 研究報告)
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概要
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Under the present financial crisis, there are a lot of scholars who attribute the main cause to enlargement of public expenditure to the demands of voters. But it is important for us to pay attention to the behavior of departments that make up the budget. In this paper, I consider the educational budgeting process for case study. By making application of the game-theoretical step, I verified that it is the mutual relationship between the Minister of Education (ME) and the Minister of Finance (MF) which causes the enlargement of educational expenditure on the supply side. A concrete survey was carried out as follows;First, in order to grasp the present situation of educational budgeting, scatter plots about the rate of assessment per expenditure item were made. There was a serious difference between the plots. It was also discovered that there were some accumulations of the plots on the upper right spot and on the vertical axis. The established expenses which have a legal basis were on the upper right one, and their rate of assessment were very much higher while the plots which were on the vetical axis were newly decided expenditure. So it is that the legal basis and the routine budgeting that push up the rate of assessment, which are one of the most powerful factors. The budgeting process of these expenditure items fit "the incrementalism," but it doesn't prove the mechanism why the difference of the rate of assessment is brought about. So it is indispensable to throw light on the real behavior of the participants who take part in the budgeting process.Then in this research, I examined not only the utility function of the ME and MF, but also the characteristics of their behavior. The utility function of the ME consists of selfish aims and altruistic ones, which are achieved through budget execution. Therefore it adopts a policy to maximize its own budget. On the other hand, the utility function of the MF consists of the difference between the evaluation of educational policy made by it and the educational budget which is really distributed to it. An incentive to behavior of it is to maximize the differences between them. As a prerequisite for their behavior, I grasped the bargaining between them as "the bilateral monopoly game". Furthermore, I set up the two models by the mode of over-sight. They were "the monopolist game" and "the monopsonist one." The determination of the expenditure which consists of the established expenses can be well explained by the former one. At this time the ME has a cotrol over the bargaining because the MF has the first turn in the game. I believe that the latter explains the bargaining mechanism of the newly decided expenditure, and it is changed into the established one by repeating the bargaining. In proportion to it, the situation of the "game" is gradually transfered from "the monopsonist game" to "the monopolist one." As a consequence of these changes, the rates of assessment are pulled up little by little. So it can be said that the behavior of the departments brings about the enlargement of the educational expenditure.
- 日本教育行政学会の論文
- 1995-10-05