リスク態度多様性のもとでの報酬契約自己選択の目的適合性
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概要
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The proportion of the wages which senior workers received in Japanese large enterprise was high, when the outcome based compensation system was introduced. This fact reflected composition of workers by age group and weighted average of wages by age. At that time the afterwards senior age groups' proportion of wages was prospected to rise. Actually, of late the proportion has risen. However, it fell below the prospect. Attitude for the risk and its degree are different by the economic agent or by the agent's income and wealth. Under the outcome based compensation system, expected value of compensation becomes smaller than that of under the member's action or process based compensation system. This is the case that an agent as a member of the organization is a risk lover because he or she prefers opportunity for higher earnings. On the contrary, under the outcome based compensation system, expected value of compensation becomes larger in the case of risk aversion agent. Thus, compensation should be based on outcome for the former and on member's action or process for the latter. Then, expected value of compensation becomes smallest. It is possible to make these incentive contracts by the choice of the member. According to their risk attitude they in each one choose contract throughout the time period until outcome occurs. In addition, actual increase amount of total wages of Japanese large enterprise may have fallen below prospect amount in the introduction period of the outcome based compensation system, as long as the risk lover workers surpass the risk aversion workers.
- 中央学院大学の論文
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