業績管理会計の機能と報酬期待値(公募プロジェクト研究)
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概要
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The outcome in each period fluctuates by factors such as state of environment and actions of the other members, time lag between action and outcome which it brings about. If motivation without risk sharing or with lower risk sharing is available, expected value of compensation awarded is able to be reduced. Performance accounting outputs a signal for a pair of state and action. Thus the accounting has an important function of performance measurement in the case of outcome based compensation, especially compensation which is fully dependent on outcome. The function contributes to feed-forward control for motivation under the naive linkage between compensation and outcome. On the other hand, performance measurement function contributes to feed-back control for improving action. In the case member's action or process is observed and appraised, then compensation is partially dependent on action and outcome. So expected value of compensation becomes smaller than that of the above compensation by risk premium, which is awarded to risk averse member for risk sharing.
- 中央学院大学の論文
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