国家財政と初期政商 : 明治7年抵当増額令までの過程を中心に
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概要
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The purpose of this article is to analyze the mutual relation between national finance and the early "Seisho" (the business man with political affiliations dominant in the period of the original capital formation) from 1868 to 1874, which has been so far neglected, mainly in the case of the "Mitsuis, through the study of the form of the early "Seisho" in the organizations of the national treasury, the characteristics of the way they obtained much profit by utilizing the Government money, and the correspondence to that decree, from the point of the credit of public and the early "Seishos". The conclusion of my analysis are following. First. Being different from the West where the unity of the organizations of the national treasury was realized by the consolidation of funds (for example, in England, Consolidated Fund Act in 1787), in Japan, because of the fragility of the public credit, the first subject of unity of the organizations was the regulation of "Kawasegata" (a semiofficial organ dealing with the Government money) by giving commission and taking mortgage, and moreover the abolishment of it, in order to avoid the collapse of the national finance which the loss of the government money depositting in "Kawasegata" without enough mortgage might have brought about. Secondly. The fundamental characteristic of the early "Seisho" was that they subordinated the national finance to the practice of the feudal credit that the feudal big merchant such as "Ryogaesho" (a money-changer) had been used to lend all money (including the government money) on deposit without the reserve. So the favorable money-accumulation of the Mitsuis was only possible under the condition that the Mitsuis was able to use the government money with no interest without placing mortgage. Thirdly. The reason why only the Mitsuis survived that decree was that the Government had given tacit permission to the requests of the Mitsuis' not only to tide over the economic crisis brought about by the Onos' bankruptcy but to protect 'Japanese credit'. And the Government decided upon or was obliged to take the positive policy to form the original capital mainly through the national finance, especially the public credit, for the public credit surpassed the early "Seishos" credit because of the bankruptcy of the Onos.
- 政治経済学・経済史学会の論文
- 1980-04-20