コーポレート・ガバナンスと経営者報酬(中田信正教授退任記念号)

概要

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The compensation of top executives is a subject that has generated much debate in the United States since 1980s due to the large increases in executive compensation of leading companies. Agency theory has emerged as the principal theory guiding research on the pay-performance relationship. Agency theory predicts a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance. However, much agency-based empirical work done on the determinants of compensation in the last thirty years shows that there is only a very weak statistical link between executive compensation and corporate performance. An understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing an effective corporate governance system. This paper reviews some research on pay for performance of CEOs and suggests a more integrated approach, including non-economic factors. Section 2 describes the pay trends and forms of long-term incentives of top executives in the United States. Section 3 reviews some agency-based empirical research on top executives pay. Section 4 discusses that executive risk-bearing is contingent on the situations and that executives can entrench themselves by influencing the CEO-Board relationship. Section 5 is concluding remarks.
桃山学院大学の論文