規制産業における政治的交換の効率性

概要

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I present a "political-exchange" model in a Japanese regulatory industry based on a non-cooperative game, which contains several characteristics of both complementary and substitutive lobbying activity under a regulatory body with an extraordinary degree of discretionary power. The model shows the following main results: (1) While a substitutive lobbying firm can reduce its lobbying expenses more than those of a complementary lobbying firm, the substitutive lobbying firm's quota is always smaller than the complementary one; (2) since the equilibrium pure-tax rate with complementary lobbying activity is higher than that with substitutive lobbying activity, then the regulator's utility in the complementary case is always higher; (3) the firm's profit is a decreasing function of the absolute value of lobbying spillover effects; (4) in the long-run, the regulatory equilibrium with substitutive lobbying activity results in insufficient entry, and the equilibrium with complementary lobbying activity results in excess entry; (5) the free-entry equilibrium automatically brings the second best result as long as the degree of lobbying spillover effects are not so small. These results may suggest that a powerful regulatory body and a tight industrial association in a Japanese regulatory industry are institutional complement.
桃山学院大学の論文