核不拡散体制の安定条件 : NPT体制を超えて

概要

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The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple model of a nuclear nonproliferation system by using a game theory from the standpoint of the international political economy and to consider what conditions are needed for the system to be stable. While the international political economy is a field that studies interactions between the international economy and international politics, in this paper we will find out what costs and benefits affect a nation-state's choice to develop nuclear weapons, and we will analyze the necessary conditions for a stable nuclear nonproliferation system. We will use a game theory with incomplete information to construct the model. A main finding of this paper is that even in an age when nuclear powers cannot firmly commit themselves to punishing other nations for acquiring nuclear weapons, a stable nuclear nonproliferation system could be maintained if the system has sufficient credibility for nuclear nonproliferation. We here define the system's credibility as the reliability of the nuclear nonproliferation policies formed based on its past achievements. However, it would be difficult to get such credibility under the NPT system. Therefore we would have to consider a new international regime to build a stable nuclear nonproliferation system.
神戸大学の論文
2002-02-28