銀行預金と郵便貯金の複占モデルについてのゲーム理論的分析 : 郵便貯金の raison d'etre

概要

論文の詳細を見る
In Japan, public financial intermediaries are as important as private financial intermediaries. Private financial intermediaries try to maximize profit and public financial intermediaries try to maximize social welfare. In this paper, we construct a duopoly model of commercial bank and Postal Savings Bank and study static and dynamic games between them. We consider Raison D'etre of Postal Savings Bank. This paper consists of the following sections : I Introduction II Static and dynamic Cournot games between private financial intermediaries III Static and dynamic Cournot games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediaries IV Monopoly behavior of public financial intermediaries and private financial intermediaries V Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries VI Dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediaries where the financial product is undifferentiated VII Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries where the financial product is differentiated VIII Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediaries where the financial product is differentiated IX Conclusions
神戸大学の論文
1997-03-10