Merger, Corporate Financing, Managerial Incentives and R & D Effort Duplication

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概要

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• We characterize the interplay between oligopolistic firms'strategic decisions in product development, and their incentives for (or against) merger. In an R & D intensive industry where newly developed products can be awarded exclusive patent protection, individual firms'profit maximization can result in effort duplication, which is socially suboptimal. Such strategic incentives can be curtailed by [1] tightening corporate financing, [2] corporate profit taxation, [3] reduction in R & D subsidies, or [4] delegating product development decisions to short-lived managers. The former two ([1] and [2]) also discourage merger. On the other hand, the latter two ([3] and [4]) indirectly encourage merger, as the managerial incentives discouraged away from effort duplication are a consequence of oligopolistic competition, so that the owners of these firms have extra incentives toward merger to eliminate competition altogether.

• 2004-03-18

著者

• 佐々木 弾

  東京大学社会科学研究所

• Cardon James

  Brigham Young University

関連論文

• Brand Names : Markets for Envy and Prestige(Economic Law and Industrial Organization)
• Merger, Corporate Financing, Managerial Incentives and R & D Effort Duplication

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