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Our theory of meaning is, according to Davidsonian philosophy of language and philsophy of psychology, to keep step with our theory of belief ascription. No priority is said to be expected of either theory. If we observe their partnership closely, however, third thoery i.e. our thoery of intentional action leads the dance. The intentional action in the case is, of course, our utterance completed or uncompleted. No more words in the utterance are to be given any meaning without explaing the uttererance by the pourpose, than belief-contents are to be ascribed to the utterer without describing it as the intentional action of such and such reason. Because the pourpose of the utterance is contained in the reason of the intentional acition, three thoeries have the related structures combined by the teleological component of pourpose or part of reason. First I show an essential character of the intentional action in general by investigating uncompleted ones. Secondly I applicate the essential character to the intentional action of uttreance and find a solution to the Davidsonian problems of our understanding quickly uncompleted utterances and Mrs. Malaprop's utterance . Thirdly I make some observations to the Gricean psychological theory of meaning , especailly to Gricean circle, and Austin's thory of speach acts on my investigation of uncompleted intentional actions. Last I make some comments on Dummettian compositionality of meaning and belief-content opposed to Quinean holistic idea of the theory of meaning.(235 words)
- 電気通信大学の論文
- 2005-01-31