STOCHASTICALLY STABLE STATES IN A DUOPOLY WITH DIFFERENTIATED GOODS

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概要

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• We present results on finite population evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) and stochastically stable states for a model of evolution with an imitative rule of strategy choice in a symmetric duopoly with differentiated goods. Two firms play price setting and quantity setting duopoly games under general demand functions. We will show that the stochastically stable state in a price setting duopoly and that in a quantity setting duopoly coincide.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Tanaka Yasuhito

  Faculty Of Law Chuo University

関連論文

• STOCHASTICALLY STABLE STATES IN A DUOPOLY WITH DIFFERENTIATED GOODS
• ENDOGENOUS PROTECTION, PRODUCT QUALITY AND CONSUMERS' WELFARE IN OLIGOPOLY

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