ENDOGENOUS PROTECTION, PRODUCT QUALITY AND CONSUMERS' WELFARE IN OLIGOPOLY
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概要
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This paper examines the quality choice by home and foreign firms in the first period in a two period oligopoly when the government of the home country may implement some protection policy in the second period, the level of which depends on the volume of imports in the first period. I will show that when the effect of the protection policy by the home country on the profits of the foreign firms is larger than that on the profits of the home firms, the quality of the foreign (or home) products in the first period with endogenous protection is lower (or higher) than without it. When the effect of the protection policy by the home country on the profits of the home firms is larger than that on the profits of the foreign firms, we have the converse result. Further I will show that endogeneity of the protection policy decreases the average consumers' welfare in the first period compared to the case without endogeneity.
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関連論文
- STOCHASTICALLY STABLE STATES IN A DUOPOLY WITH DIFFERENTIATED GOODS
- ENDOGENOUS PROTECTION, PRODUCT QUALITY AND CONSUMERS' WELFARE IN OLIGOPOLY